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Abstract
The author presents in this article the differences in understanding of negligence in Polish and 
English criminal law. It analyses and discusses the relation between guilt, culpability and negligence 
in the two legal systems. Criminal responsibility in Polish and English law is based on mens rea, which 
is defined as an element of crime related to the defendant’s state of mind at the time of committing 
the crime. In English criminal law mens rea means intention, recklessness, negligence, intoxication, 
and culpability. Nowadays in Polish criminal law the relation between mens rea and culpability 
is determined by the normative theory of guilt.  
 The first part of this paper contains an outline of the evolution of criminal responsibility 
for negligent acts in the Polish criminal code and English common law. The second part provides 
a detailed analysis of the criteria for a negligent act in the two systems. In the last part the author 
asks an important question: should negligence be punishable? These considerations lead the author 
to a number of conclusions. 
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I.  AN OUTLINE OF THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
 NEGLIGENT ACTS IN THE POLISH CRIMINAL CODE AND ENGLISH  
 COMMON LAW 
Criminal responsibility in Polish and English law is based on mens rea, 
which is defined as an element of crime related to the defendant’s state of 
mind at the time of committing the crime1. In English criminal law mens 
*  Professor at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Law and Administration, 
Chair of Criminal Law and Criminology.
1  J. Herring, Criminal Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford 2004, p. 140.
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rea means intention, recklessness, negligence, intoxication, and culpability. 
It can be stated that this term concerns the subjective element of a crime, guilt, 
and the excuse of intoxication, which makes a criminal act inculpable. 
Nowadays in Polish criminal law the relation between mens rea and 
culpability is determined by the normative theory of guilt2. According 
to that theory,  mens rea and guilt (guilty mind) should be distinguished. 
As mens rea means intention, recklessness, and negligence and it is 
expressed in a statute, guilty mind means that the defendant’s act is 
inexcusable (although it has been committed with intention, recklessly or 
negligently) and it is not defined by law. In the other words, committing 
a criminal act with intention, recklesness, or negligence is not sufficient 
to impute criminal liability as it may be inculpable. Although there is no 
definition of guilt in Polish criminal law, it is certain that it is determined 
by the actor’s age, his sanity at the time of the crime, and the question 
of whether a reasonable man would have done the same as the actor did 
if he found himself in the same circumstances (ordinary circumstances). 
In this context intention, recklessness, and negligence have nothing to do 
with culpability because they determine committing a criminal act, not the 
defendant’s  guilt. That is why committing a criminal act is not sufficient 
for criminal liability. 
The problem of negligence is that it is hardly possible to distinguish 
mens rea and guilt here. In modern Polish criminal law, a criminal act 
committed with negligence has always been a crime although the definition 
of negligence changed during the course of history. In the criminal code of 
1932 (section 14) it was defined as an act in which an actor did not consider 
the possible result of committing the criminal act although he could or 
should have considered it. 
This definition was criticised in the literature for a few reasons. First 
of all, it was argued that there was no sound reason for limiting criminal 
2  About the definition of guilt in Polish criminal doctrine see e.g. K. Buchała, Wina – wina 
nieumyślna [Guilt – Unintentional Guilt], ZNUJ-Prace Prawnicze [ZNUJ Legal Papers] 1977, 
p. 74; G. Rejman, Teorie i formy winy w prawie karnym [Theories and Forms of Guilt in Criminal 
Law], Warszawa 1980, p. 146 et seq.; A. Wąsek, Ewolucja prawnokarnego pojęcia winy 
w powojennej Polsce [Evolution of Interpretation of Guilt in Polish Post-war Criminal Law], Przegląd 
Prawa Karnego [Criminal Law Review] 1990, p. 5; A. Zoll, [in:] Kodeks karny. Komentarz. Cześć 
ogólna. Komentarz do art. 1-116 [Criminal Code. Commentary. General part. Commentary to Articles 
1-116], Warszawa 2012, pp. 78-81; T. Kaczmarek, Spory wokół pojęcia winy w prawie karnym 
[Disputes Concerning a Notion of Guilt in Criminal Law], [in:] Rozważania o przestępstwie i karze. 
Wybór prac z okres 40-lecia naukowej twórczości [Reflections on Crime and Punishment. Selection of 
Publications from 40-years of Academic Work], Warszawa 2006, pp. 267-273; A. Marek, Ujęcie winy 
w prawie karnym jako problem kodyfikacyjny [Guilt in Criminal Law as a Codification Problem], [in:] 
W kręgu teorii i praktyki prawa karnego. Księga poświęcona pamięci prof. A. Wąska [About the Theory 
and Practice of Criminal Law. Volume in Honour of Prof. A Wąsek], Lublin 2005.
responsibility for negligent acts only to crimes with a certain result. Such 
a definition excluded criminal liability for a negligent crime, in which 
a certain result was legally indifferent. Secondly, it is worth stating, that 
according to section 14 of the criminal code of Poland of 1932, a person 
acted negligently if according to law he or she should have predicted the 
possibility of causing a criminal result although he or she had no individual 
ability to foresee it. Furthermore, the actor was criminally responsible for 
a negligent act if according to law he was not obliged to predict the possibility 
of committing a crime, but at the time of the act he had the individual 
capacity to foresee it. It could lead to the unacceptable conclusion that such 
an actor could be criminally responsible even though no regulation obliged 
him to predict the negative results of his act3. It was argued that an actor 
could be liable for a result caused negligently only when he or she was 
obliged by law to predict a certain risk of committing a crime and had the 
individual ability to foresee it at the time of the criminal act4. In the Polish 
literature there were attempts to eliminate this inappropriate regulation by 
narrowing the interpretation of section 14 of the Polish Criminal Code of 
1932. It was emphasised that it was a case of when an actor was obliged by 
law to foresee some risks and had the individual ability to predict them5. 
Such perception of negligence was acceptable because it rationally limited 
criminal responsibility for a negligent act in comparison with the definition 
of negligence in the criminal code of 1932. This interpretation was also 
made in favour of a defendant. 
Unquestionably during the debate over the new criminal code it 
was emphasised that negligence must be defined in a way which would 
prevent potential interpretation problems as mentioned above. According 
to section 7 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1969,  an actor was criminally 
responsible for a negligent act if he did not predict the risk of committing 
a crime although by law he  was obliged to predict it and had the individual 
ability to foresee it. This definition of a negligent act avoided the inaccuracy 
of the similar definition in the Polish Criminal Code of 1932. To make an 
actor criminally liable for a negligent act it was necessary to state whether 
there was any regulation which obliged him to predict the crime risk and 
whether his  state of mind and character allowed him  to foresee the crime. 
3  W. Wolter, Z rozważań nad nieumyślnością [Reflections Concerning Unintentionality], Państwo 
i Prawo [State and Law] 1962, vol. 5-6, p. 801; H. Popławski, Niedbalstwo jako postać winy 
nieumyślnej [Negligence as a Unintentional Guilt], Palestra [The Bar] 1962, vol. 10, p. 50.
4  S. Pławski, Przyczynek do zagadnienia winy w polskim prawie karnym [Contribution to the Issue 
of Guilt in Polish Criminal Law], Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy [Military Law Overview]  1956, 
no. 4, p. 375.
5  Wolter, supra note 3, p. 802 and the authors mentioned in that article.
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Both precautions must have been fulfilled contrary to the regulation in the 
Criminal code of 1932. In the literature it was stated that the individual 
characteristics of an actor had to be taken into consideration before giving 
an opinion as to whether he or she was able to predict the risk of crime or 
he or she ought to have predicted it. 
Such regulation was criticised by those who were in favour of 
a normative doctrine of guilt according to which guilt existed when an 
actor committed an inexcusable act even though it had nothing to do with 
mens rea (intention, recklessness and negligence). It was emphasised that 
mens rea is a substantial element of a criminal act defined in a statute, 
but it is not sufficient to sentence an actor; it was not equated to guilt. In 
other words intention, recklessness, and negligence must be described in 
a statute. It is not sufficient to state that an actor committed an act with 
intention, recklessly, or negligently. The other condition of his criminal 
responsibility was guilt, which was not defined in the statute. In order to 
distinguish properly intention, recklessness, and negligence from guilt, the 
regulation concerning mens rea and guilt was divided in the Polish Criminal 
Code of 1997. In section 1 § 3 it is stated that there is no crime if there is no 
guilty mind. In section 9 § 1-2 of the code there is an explanation of what 
an intentional, reckless, and negligent criminal act is. According to section 
9 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1997, a negligent act must have been committed 
when the action was taken without intention, the act is a result of the breach 
of safety rules (not necessarily codified in a statute) which apply in a certain 
situation, and the actor could have predicted the criminal act.
Traditionally in English criminal law it is obvious that criminal 
responsibility is dependent on actus reus and mens rea according to the 
Latin maxim: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act cannot lead to 
criminal liability unless the actor’s mind is guilty)6. In modern criminal 
law actus reus is called the conduct element of crime, and mens rea is called 
the fault element of crime7. In other words, committing a criminal act is not 
sufficient to impose criminal responsibility.
 Just as in Polish criminal law, there are two types of actus reus (which 
is a certain act committed  by the defendant) concerning the question of 




6  Although see C.M.V. Clarkson, Understanding Criminal Law, London 2001, pp. 15-20 who 
shows that this distinction becomes more and more confusing and inappropriate. 
7  A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford 1999, p. 98.
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the mere act means actus reus regardless of the results which may come out 
of it. Secondly, there are result crimes where the lack of result may lead 
only to the responsibility for the attempt8. 
Actus reus must go with mens rea, which is a “blameworthy or culpable 
state of mind”. Both these elements of a crime must coincide in time9. 
It must be stated that the types of mens rea are intention, recklessness, and 
negligence. As shown above, in English criminal law the blameworthy or 
culpable mind means mens rea (intention, recklessness, and negligence). 
In other words, intention, recklessness, and negligence mean culpability. 
This solution is based on the psychological theory of guilt which expresses 
culpability and blameworthiness only in the actor’s state of mind at the 
time of the criminal act. This theory has been rejected in Polish criminal law, 
which – respecting the German doctrine of guilt – distinguishes between 
the defendant’s state of mind (intention, recklessness, and negligence) and 
guilt. For example, if two men were hanging on a rope over an abyss, and 
the one who was above cut the line below because the line higher up was 
breaking, he intended to kill his friend, but he was not culpable. He must 
have been aware that cutting off the line below would send his friend to 
his death, but he had no choice. He could not say that he had no intention 
of killing the man if he had seen the abyss below and had been aware of 
the consequences of falling. The question arises whether he had any other 
choice? Had he not cut the line, they both would have dropped into the 
abyss and been killed together. According to this, intention, recklessness, 
and negligence are not sufficient to say that the actor is  culpable. It means 
that culpability must be based on four presuppositions: 1) awareness or 
capacity of awareness of unlawfulness; 2) ability to act according to law; 
3) decision to act; 4) the actor acts differently from what the law could 
expect him under the circumstances10. In modern Polish criminal law there 
is a distinction between mens rea (state of the actor’s mind at the time of 
a crime) and culpability, which is understood as a situation in which the 
defendant’s act is inexcusable even though it was intentional, reckless, or 
negligent. In  other words, in Polish criminal law, if the defendant acts 
intentionally, recklessly, or negligently, it does not have to mean that he is 




8  Clarkson, supra note 6, pp. 13-14.
9  Ibidem, p. 14.
10  C.R. Snyman, Criminal Law, Durban 1995.
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and negligence from culpability can also be seen in English criminal law, 
although generally the relation between them is closer to the psychological 
than to the normative theory of culpability11.
In English common law, contrary to Polish criminal law, negligence 
was not sufficient for criminal liability except for responsibility with some 
exceptions. Because negligence is not a “subjective” state of the actor’s 
mind, it is not treated as mens rea, which is why generally it cannot lead to 
criminal responsibility based on mens rea12. In negligence, as A. Ashworth 
puts it, there is no intention or awareness of the risk the actor causes, which 
is essential for making somebody criminally liable13. That is why criminal 
responsibility in English law has always been based on intention and 
recklessness rather than on negligence.  However, it must be mentioned 
that some authors state that there is a place for individuality in negligence 
and it may lead to the conclusion that it is also subjective. As H.L.A. Hart 
puts it, in negligence there is some place for the actor’s mental and physical 
capacities in order to state whether he could have taken the necessary 
precautions14. Even though the subjective element of a crime such as an 
individual’s capacity to take precautions can be found in a negligent act, 
it is argued that it should not be the basis for criminal liability as a rule, 
because the criminal law is the law’s most condemnatory form. That is 
why the criminal law should be reserved for the most serious offences15. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that a negligent act should be criminalised 
only on the basis of the ultima ratio rule when: the harm is great, the risk 
of the harm is obvious and the actor has the individual capacity to take the 
required precautions16. These conditions of liability for negligence seem to 
narrow it and exclude criminal responsibility for a negligent act in cases 
where the risk of serious harm is not well-known, and where less serious 
harms are possible. In English law very few crimes are based on negligence. 
Generally, criminal responsibility for a negligent act is possible when 
manslaughter, public nuisance, and careless driving are concerned17.      
11  See e.g. Clarkson, supra note 6, pp. 18-20.
12  See e.g. M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, Oxford 2003, pp. 97-98; Ashworth, supra note 
7, p. 197.
13  Ashworth, supra note 7, p. 197.
14  H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford 1968, chapter 2 and 5.
15  Ashworth, supra note 7, p. 197.
16  Ibidem, p. 197.
17  J. Smith, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, London-Dublin 1999, pp. 91, 92.
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II. THE CRITERIA FOR A NEGLIGENT ACT IN POLISH AND ENGLISH  
 CRIMINAL LAW
In the Polish criminal code of 1997, according to section 9 § 2, a negligent 
act is committed when the defendant has no intention of committing 
a crime, but commits it as a result of the breach of safety rules which bind 
him in a certain situation, and if he has the capacity to foresee the risk of 
committing it.  Especially the last condition of a negligent act has been 
the source of heated argument in Polish jurisprudence since the criminal 
code came into force. It is not certain whether the capacity of risk foresight 
means predictability only for a reasonable man (the objective ability to 
predict a criminal act) or whether it should also be considered if the actor 
has the individual capacity to foresee the risk of crime.
As A. Zoll puts it, the capacity to foresee the risk of crime mentioned 
in section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code means objective ability18. In the 
author’s opinion, negligence is based on whether the risk the actor runs 
is foreseeable for a reasonable man regardless of the actor’s  individual 
capacity to predict it at the time of commitment.  As the author says, it is 
the consequence of the distinction between mens rea (which is intention, 
recklessness, and negligence) and guilt (which is a totally different condition 
of criminal responsibility). The individual capacity to foresee the risk the 
actor runs is a matter of guilt, not negligence, which is a form of mens rea. 
According to A. Zoll, the mixture of objective and subjective elements in 
negligence in section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code is inappropriate. 
The objective element of negligence (the foresight of risk for a reasonable 
man) is the matter of mens rea and act conduct, whereas the subjective 
element (individual capacity to foresee the risk) is the matter of guilt. If it 
is certain that a reasonable man would not foresee the risk the actor runs, 
it is not possible to say that defendant committed a criminal act based on 
negligence and there is no point in analysing further the problem of guilt.
It is necessary to mention another point of view about the idea of 
a negligent act according to section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code. 
As A. Wąsek argues, negligence expressed in that section cannot be limited 
only to the statement whether a reasonable man would have the capacity to 
foresee the risk the actor runs. It is equally important to consider whether 
the actor has the individual ability to estimate  the risk. According to him, 
section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code does not allow for interpretation 
18  A. Zoll, [in:] Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Komentarz do art. 1-116 [Criminal Code. Commentary. 
General Part. Commentary to Articles  1-116], Warszawa 2012, pp. 157-158.
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according to which negligence must be based only on the reasonability of an 
ordinary actor. The regulation says that negligence occurs when the actor 
commits a crime as a result of a breach of safety rules binding in a certain 
situation provided the actor has the capacity to foresee the criminal act. 
The section says nothing about what the reasonable man can foresee, in 
other words whether the risk which is caused by the actor is foreseeable for a 
reasonable man. This leads to the conclusion that the attempt to distinguish 
precisely mens rea and guilt in a negligent act was not successful19. According 
to A. Wąsek, to state whether the actor acts negligently it is necessary to 
find the basis for the obligation to foresee the risk of harm. It is a general 
and objective criterion of a reasonable man. Nevertheless it is not sufficient 
to say that the actor performed an act negligently. The individual capacity 
is also important to decide whether the negligent act can be the basis of 
criminal responsibility20.
The first opinion is not correct. It is not appropriate to limit negligence 
only to the capacity of an ordinary man, as it leads to unacceptable 
conclusions. A person who caused a certain result which is forbidden 
by law must be then called an actor if the result was foreseeable for 
a reasonable man, even though this person had no individual capacity to 
foresee the act. For instance, if in a certain case it is stated that a reasonable 
man had the capacity to foresee the results which were caused, the actor 
must be treated as a man who committed a criminal act no matter whether 
he had the individual capacity to foresee it. The actor will not be criminally 
liable because of lack of a guilty mind, but he is still called an actor though 
he has no capacity to foresee the risk he caused. A question must be raised 
if it accords with human dignity to call somebody an actor of a criminal 
act if he has no individual capacity to foresee it according to section 30 of 
the Polish Constitution. It must be admitted that the distinction between 
mens rea and guilt in Polish criminal law makes the structure of a crime 
more clear. If there is no negligence at least, an unintentional criminal act 
is not committed, but if there is negligence – the actor committed an illegal 
act if it is so stated in the statute. It does not mean he is criminally liable. 
His criminal responsibility is dependent on guilt. 
Undeniably it is very difficult to distinguish the criteria of negligence 
and guilt especially when we claim that negligence is also based on the 
19  W. Mącior, Zasady odpowiedzialności karnej w projekcie kodeksu karnego z 1995r. [Principles of 
Criminal Responsibility in the Draft of Criminal Code of 1995], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 
1996, vol. 6, p. 70.
20  A. Wąsek, Kodeks karny. Komentarz. Tom I [Criminal Code. Commentary. Vol. I], Gdańsk 1999, 
pp. 118-119.
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actor’s individual capacity to foresee the risk of crime. The problem of 
this distinction may be solved if the criteria of guilt are combined with the 
origins of the actor’s decision to commit an act, not with the capacity of 
foresight of the risk. It is a consequence of the purely normative attitude 
towards the problem of guilt. In the light of that theory, guilt is based on 
inexcusability of an actor’s decision to commit a crime which is dependent 
on the reason for such decision. The criteria of the capacity must be 
combined with negligence, and the question why the actor made a decision 
to commit a negligent act must be interconnected with the problem of 
guilt. For example, the actor’s state of mind, his maturity, knowledge, 
experience, and physical condition determine his capacity for foreseeing 
the risk. If the actor has appropriate knowledge to foresee the risk, he may 
be negligent. However it does not mean that he is guilty, as it is determined 
by the reason why he did not make use of the knowledge. If he makes no 
use of this knowledge because he does not concentrate his attention, he 
will be guilty of committing a crime.  Still it must be mentioned that the 
criteria of capacity to foresee the risk and of the origins of actor’s decision 
to commit an act are not clear. In some cases it is very difficult to make 
a distinction between the individual criteria of risk foresight and the source 
of the actor’s decision to commit a crime. For instance, the actor’s maturity 
and his mental disability may lead to the lack of capacity to foresee the 
risk of crime and can determine the ground of his decision. In other words, 
sometimes the same criteria concern the individual capacity to foresee the 
risk and guilt.              
To conclude the discussion over the section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal 
Code of 1997, in fine, an amendment to that section was proposed in 2013. 
According to that proposal, recklessness and negligence were to be based 
only on lack of intention without conditions such as objective or individual 
criteria of crime prediction. As a mens rea no intention was to be sufficient 
to say that the actor acted unintentionally under the conditions that 
the crime was objectively predictable. It is worth  emphasising that the 
objective prediction of crime was no longer to be an element of mens rea 
(as an element of negligence) but the element of actus reus (the amended 
section 1 § 1a of the Polish Criminal Code of 1997). The criminal act was 
committed unintentionally if the actor had no intention of committing it 
(mens rea), but the commission was predictable for a reasonable man (not 
for the certain actor; actus reus). 
This proposal was criticised for a few reasons. First of all, such 
a regulation does not face the standard of nullum crimen sine lege on the basis 
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of section 42 of the Polish Constitution21. This regulation says that criminal 
responsibility can be based only on the act which is stated precisely in the 
statute. Saying that recklessness and negligence mean only lack of intention 
is far away from that precision. Secondly, lack of intention as a condition of 
recklessness and negligence could be inferred from section 9 § 1 of The Polish 
Criminal Code a contrario. If the section states clearly what the intention is, 
then the lack of conditions of intention must lead to the conclusion it is 
the case of recklessness or negligence. If negligence and recklessness were 
to be limited to lack of intention, there would be no need to emphasise 
it in section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code of 1997. Such a regulation 
of unintentional acts repeated the same conclusion which emerged from 
section 9 § 1 of the Code a contrario. Thirdly,  it was argued that the 
proposed amendment led to the broadening of criminal responsibility for 
an unintentional act. It deprived recklessness and negligence of additional 
conditions such as prediction (recklessness) or capacity for prediction 
(negligence) of risk. In the case of an unintentional criminal act, only 
a lack of intention (apart from the conduct itself) had to be proved,  not the 
capacity of the prediction of a crime. Fourthly, it led to the presumption of 
unintentional commission (reckless or negligent). If in a certain case there 
was no possibility of proving intention, it must be presumed that the actor 
acted without intention. It meant a presumption of negligent commitment. 
A negligent act was committed when it was foreseeable for a reasonable 
man and the actor had no intention of committing it. These were the only 
conditions of ascribing it.  Fifthly the amendment makes it hardly possible 
to distinguish a reckless act and a negligent act because in both cases only 
lack of intention was sufficient.
These arguments led to another proposal for an amendment in 
section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code. According to the proposal of the 
5th of November 2013, this section described recklessness and negligence 
as acts without intention, under the condition that in certain circumstances 
committing a crime could be predicted. It must be noticed that this new 
formula for a reckless or negligent act is not based only on the objective 
criteria of a reasonable man but takes into consideration also individual 
“circumstances”. The authors of the project must have been aware of the 
necessity to consider subjective and individual criteria in recklessness 
21  J. Lachowski, Ocena projektowanych zmian art. 9 kk [Opinion Concerning Proposed Changes 
in the Art. 9 of Criminal Code], Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 2014, vol. 1, pp. 86-89; on 
the contrary e.g. W. Wróbel, Określenie strony podmiotowej czynu zabronionego z perspektywy 
funkcji gwarancyjnej [Determination of an Actor of a Criminal Act from the Perspective of a Guarantee 
Function], [in:] Umyślność i jej formy [Intent and Its Forms], Toruń 2011, p. 10 et seq.
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and negligence and they expressed their awareness by putting particular 
emphasis on “certain circumstances”. Still they made no distinction 
between recklessness and negligence in the project, which did not go 
with the principle of individualisation of criminal responsibility. Finally, 
section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Law has not been amended. This section 
left the argument about objective or subjective interpretation of the risk 
prediction in section 9 § 2 of the Code unsolved.    
In English criminal law, just as in Polish criminal law, negligence 
is based on lack of intention or risk foresight. The defendant does not 
realise he runs the risk while committing an act and thinks he is acting 
appropriately. He is not aware of the danger that is caused by his act. Unlike 
in case of recklessness, there is no prediction of risk. Generally, negligence 
in English criminal law is based on objective grounds22. The actor is liable 
for a negligent act if he did not behave reasonably in the circumstances 
in which he acted. If his decision were reasonable, he could not bear the 
responsibility for the negligent act23.
The criteria of negligence are also a subject of discussion in English 
criminal law. There is no agreement as to what negligence is. For some 
authors, it is not easy to establish the difference between a negligent act 
and an act caused by panic or fear. In the case of panic and fear usually 
there is no room for rational reflection, that is why such an act is hardly 
negligent24. Another problem is the question of whether the risk assessment 
should be related to the standard test of a “reasonable” or “ordinary” man. 
The problem is whether negligence occurs when an actor does not live up 
to the standard that people should abide by or to the normal standard25. 
Some argue that in negligence cases it is essential to compare the actor to a 
reasonable man with the defendant’s characteristics. An example is given of 
a blind actor who commits a crime without intention. In order to determine 
whether he was negligent, it is essential to compare his behaviour to 
a blind reasonable man in the same circumstances26. In other words, there 
is not one general type of the reasonable man test. Negligence must not be 
based on a comparison of the defendant’s act with the behaviour of any 
reasonable man, but to the behaviour of a reasonable man who has the same 
characteristics as the actor. It is important to state whether a reasonable man 
of similar age, sight, hearing, and  education would behave in the same 
22  See e.g. Smith, supra note 17, p. 90.
23  See e.g. Herring, supra note 1, p. 165; Clarkson, supra note 6, p. 71.
24  Herring, supra note 1, p. 195 and the cases the author refers to.
25  Ibidem.
26  Ibidem. 
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way as the actor did27. It is important to mention that in English criminal 
law doctrine it is stated that the reasonable person test is arbitral. As 
L. Alexander, K. Kessler Ferzan and S. Morse have remarked  “reasonable 
person in the actor’s situation” is hardly definable28. They stress  two 
boundaries of this structure. Firstly, the reasonable person in the actor’s 
situation has the knowledge about all the facts that determine a correct 
moral decision. On the other side there is the reasonable person who has all 
the actor’s beliefs29. In the first case, the reasonable person always chooses 
the action that prevents the harm because he knows everything that allows 
him to avert the risk. If the actor causes the risk in that case, he is always 
responsible for the act, and this responsibility actually means strict liability. 
In the second case,  when the reasonable person always knows what the 
actor knows, there is no question of there having been a negligent act if there 
is no awareness of the risk30. It must be agreed that in these cases negligence 
is somewhere between strict liability and recklessness, but it is not certain 
where exactly it should be situated  In conclusion, the authors claim that 
“the reasonable actor is neither the actual actor nor the omniscient god, but 
some construct that lies in between. Because there is no principled way to 
determine the composition of this construct, punishment for negligence is 
morally arbitrary”31. This means that criminal responsibility for a negligent 
act is actually arbitrary, which may lead to the conclusion that it collides 
with the nullum crimen sine lege principle.
III. SHOULD NEGLIGENCE BE PUNISHABLE?
Differently from Polish criminal law, responsibility for a negligent act 
in English law has traditionally been rejected with some exceptions. The 
reason for such an attitude  to negligence was that mens rea was defined as 
a state of mind and in a negligent act there is no state of mind, but the so 
called “blank state of mind”. The actor does not foresee the risk emerging 
from his action which was foreseeable for a reasonable man. If negligence 
means “blank state of mind” towards the committed act, it cannot be 
treated as subjective mens rea. If the subjective mens rea is substantial for 
criminal responsibility, the lack of that element must lead to no criminal 
27  M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, Oxford 2003, pp. 98-99.
28  L. Alexander, K. Kessler Ferzan, S. Morse, Crime and Culpability. A Theory of Criminal Law, 
Cambridge 2009, p. 81.
29  Ibidem, p. 82.
30  Ibidem. 
31  Ibidem.
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liability32. In the English doctrine of criminal law the discussion as to 
whether a negligent act should be punishable is in progress. As some 
authors claim, the penalty for negligent acts should not stimulate diligence, 
as such acts reflect only moral fault. They state that deterrence, which is 
one of the “faces” of punishment, concerns the probability of punishment 
by the actor before committing a crime. To make this estimation, the 
actor must be aware of the risk of crime in order to make any calculation. 
In a negligent act there is no awareness of the risk33. Hence, there is no point 
in punishing for a negligent act. Moreover, it is emphasised that punishing 
the actor for a negligent act does not prevent him from committing such 
an act in the future. On the other hand, there are authors who state that 
punishing someone for a negligent act may cause greater foresight as to 
the risks; still it is certain that such responsibility is extraordinary34. As the 
criminal law is ultima ratio, it is remarked sometimes that negligent acts 
should be prevented by education and insurance against the risk35. Some 
researches argue that there is no moral legitimacy in imputing criminal 
responsibility to somebody who was not aware of the risk that he was 
committing a crime36. Still, it is also stated that if the risk of fatal, serious 
consequences, which come out of a negligent act is high, society is bound 
to take any measures to guarantee safety. In that case, even punishment is 
acceptable37. 
In Polish criminal law liability for an unintentional act is not a rule. 
According to section 8 of the Polish Criminal Code, responsibility for 
a reckless or negligent act is possible only when it is clearly allowed by the 
statute. It means that not every intentional criminal act has its unintentional 
parallel act in the statute. If criminal responsibility for a reckless and 
negligent act is extraordinary, then it should be clearly stated in law 
what recklessness and negligence are. Traditionally, in Polish criminal 
law, acts committed through negligence have always been punishable. 
Nevertheless it is not certain whether a negligent act should lead to criminal 
responsibility.
In the Polish doctrine there are hardly any authors who clearly 
state that criminal responsibility for a negligent act should be excluded. 
As T. Kaczmarek puts it, following M. Król-Bogomilska, indirect intention 
(the actor predicts the criminal act and accepts it, section 9 § 1 of the 
32  Clarkson, supra note 6, p. 71.
33  Smith, supra note 17, p. 94 and the authors mentioned there.
34  Ibidem.
35  Ibidem.
36  Alexander, Kessler Ferzan, Morse, supra note 28, p. 71.
37  Smith, supra note 17, p. 94 and the authors mentioned there.
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Polish Criminal Code of 1997 in fine) is based on unclear criteria and the 
presumption of the acceptance of the risk, and that is why it should be 
eliminated from the categories of intention. In the author’s opinion, in that 
case there would be also no room for negligence which is a far more unclear 
example of objective responsibility38. On the other hand, as the author says, 
the exclusion of liability for negligence in criminal law does not seem to be 
reasonable for reasons of criminal policy39. In the older doctrine of criminal 
law it was stated that negligence is combined with a presumption of guilt 
and that the borderline between negligence and the lack of negligence is so 
slight that sometimes it is hardly noticeable40. As M. Król-Bogomilska puts 
it, the reasonable man standard as a basis of responsibility for negligent 
criminal act leads to a presumption of negligence when the actor’s 
behaviour does not comply with the “artificial” reasonable man behaviour 
standard41.
It must be agreed, according to what was referred to above, that the 
criminalisation of a negligent act does not deter anyone from committing 
such crimes. A negligent actor does not know that he is committing an 
unintentional crime. Moreover, he thinks he is acting legally and is 
not causing any unlawful risk. The criminal law can hardly stimulate 
a human being’s behaviour only when the actor realises that a certain act 
is forbidden under the threat of penalty. A negligent actor does not realise 
that what he is doing is forbidden by law. He may be aware that the results 
which emerge from his action are penalised, but he does not realise that 
he is causing this criminalised result at the time of crime. That is why the 
penalisation of such an act can hardly prevent him from committing it. 
It must be remembered that the criminal law is subsidiary to the measures 
accepted in the other branches of the law42. Therefore the criminalisation 
of an act is justified if the sanctions characteristic of the other branches are 
not sufficient. Remembering that a criminal sanction for a negligent act can 
hardly deter anyone from risky actions, and considering  the subsidiary 
38  T. Kaczmarek, Sporne problemy umyślności [Disputable problems of intent], [in:] J. Majewski 
(ed.), Umyślność i jej formy [Intent and its Forms], Toruń 2011, p. 41.
39  Ibidem. 
40  W. Mącior, Problem przestępstw nieumyślnych na tle aktualnych wymagań teorii i praktyki 
[A Question of Unintentional Crimes from the Perspective of the Current Requirements of Theory and 
Practice], Kraków 1968, p. 73 et seq.; A. Gubiński, Zasady prawa karnego [Prinicples of Criminal 
Law], Warszawa 1996, p. 71; M. Król-Bogomilska, Formy winy w prawie karnym w świetle 
psychologii [Types of Guilt in Criminal Law from the Perspective of Psychology], Warszawa 1991, 
p. 116.
41  Król-Bogomilska, supra note 40, pp. 115-116.
42  See eg. A. Zoll, W. Wróbel, Polskie prawo karne. Część ogólna [Polish Criminal Code. General 
Part], Kraków 2010, pp. 25-26.
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role of the criminal law in relation to other law branches, the problem 
of the usefulness of the criminalisation of a negligent act must be raised. 
The need for the criminalisation of acts based on negligence may seem to be 
doubtful especially when given that there is no agreement about the criteria 
of negligent act expressed in section 9 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code of 
1997. The lack of definite criteria of negligence in Polish criminal law, 
giving the limits of criminal responsibility for an unintentional act, leads to 
the conclusion that the limits of criminal responsibility for a negligent act 
are not clear. If the limits of criminal responsibility are not clear, it may be 
argued that criminal acts of negligence do not live up to the nullum crimen 
sine lege standard. Criminal law is based on the “ultima ratio” principle and 
operates with the most severe sanctions. The limits of criminal responsibility 
must then be clear. It cannot be agreed that even though the limits of 
a negligent act are not clear, a person who has committed such an act (the 
negligent criminal act was committed) may not be criminally responsible 
because of the lack of guilt. First of all, there is no precise definition of guilt 
in the Polish Criminal Code of 1997. Secondly, in Polish criminal doctrine 
there is no agreement as to what guilt is. There are a few theories of guilt 
(psychological theory, normative theory, functional theory, relative theory) 
and each defines it in a different way presenting different limits of criminal 
liability43.   If it is not possible to present clear boundaries of liability for 
a negligent act, it should not be penalised. It cannot be agreed that the 
“reasonable person test” limits criminal responsibility for a negligent act. 
A “reasonable person” is an artificial figure, with unclear criteria, which 
makes the problem of negligence in criminal law more complex and may 
lead to confusion when establishing the limits of criminal liability for such 
an act.  The lack of clear criteria for a negligent criminal act may also lead 
to different court sentences in similar cases where negligence is at stake. 
The same case judged in one court may be judged differently in another. 
Thus it is very close to the breach of the principle of equal treatment of 
citizens in the same circumstances by law (section 32.1. of the Constitution 
of Poland).
The only reason for the criminalisation of a negligent act is the kind of 
harm that can emerge from it. The more serious the harm, the more solid is 
the degree of the criminalisation. The more serious the results of a human 
being’s action, the bigger the temptation to make it a statutory crime. Even 
in such cases the question must be asked whether criminalisation of such 
43  About theories of guilt see J. Lachowski, [in:] R. Dębski (ed.), System prawa karnego. Tom III. 
Nauka o przestępstwie. Zasady odpowiedzialności karnej [System of Criminal Law. Vol III. Principles 
of Criminal Responsibility], Warszawa 2013, p. 618 and the authors mentioned there. 
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a negligent act will protect an individual from serious consequences in the 
future. It must be agreed that a more adequate way of preventing such 
serious harms is to educate people as to how not to create dangers and 
risks. Obligatory insurances are also a good solution in order to provide 
a form of compensation in such cases44. The criminal law is a very “simple” 
solution, but supposedly its effectiveness in preventing  a negligent act 
may be very slight.     
  
 
44  Smith, supra note 17, p. 90-96.
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